Global Public Goods and Global Health by Gartner, David
GARTNER - TO PRINT(DO NOT DELETE) 5/22/2012 5:51 PM 
 
303 
GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS AND GLOBAL HEALTH 
DAVID GARTNER* 
INTRODUCTION 
Many of today’s biggest global challenges reflect failures of collective 
action in providing global public goods. When it comes to preventing 
pandemic disease, climate change, or weapons proliferation, there are 
strong incentives for national governments not to cooperate to provide 
optimal levels of global public goods. In order to better understand those 
incentives in the context of global health challenges, leading categories for 
distinguishing different types of global public goods ought to be re-
conceptualized as highlighting different stages of production of global 
public goods. While the conventional wisdom remains that wider 
participation is essentially an obstacle to effective collective action, 
leveraging the contributions of diverse actors can contribute to catalyzing 
the effective provision of global public goods. 
This article advances a new analytical approach to the challenge of 
providing global public goods that highlights the distinct problems of 
innovation, financing, and compliance. Part I analyzes the major obstacles 
to providing global public goods and the existing frameworks for 
conceptualizing these obstacles. Part II uses existing frameworks to analyze 
several specific global health challenges in order to gain insight into the 
different dimensions of global public goods production and the growing 
role of non-state actors in providing global public goods. Part III introduces 
an alternative approach to conceptualizing global public goods and 
highlights its implications for governance and global public goods. 
I. CATEGORIZING GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS 
Recent scholarship has highlighted the significant institutional and 
legal obstacles involved in the provision of global public goods, but such 
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problems have been recognized for many years.1 The concept of public 
goods was first highlighted three centuries ago by David Hume.2 He 
identified what has come to be known as the “free rider” problem: the 
incentive for an individual to “free himself of the trouble and expense, 
and . . . lay the whole burden on others.”3 Since that time, the concept of 
public goods has been elaborated upon by many leading economic thinkers. 
Adam Smith recognized the existence of certain goods 
 
which though they may be in the highest degree advantageous to a great 
society are, however, of such a nature that the profits could never repay 
the expense to any individual or small number of individuals, and which 
it therefore cannot be expected that any individual or small number of 
individuals should erect.4 
 
The challenge with such public goods is that there are weaker incentives 
for private provision because their benefits generally cannot be made 
excludable and their consumption generally cannot be made exclusive. 
The challenge of providing public goods is commonly viewed as 
becoming increasingly difficult as the number of participants involved 
expands. This view reflects Mancur Olson’s work on collective action 
problems and his conclusion that the obstacles to cooperation increase 
along with the number of participants whose cooperation is required.5 
Olson found that only small groups, or those groups with selective 
incentives, will collectively organize. The larger the group, Olson argued, 
the “farther it will fall short in providing the optimal amount of a collective 
good.”6 Even today, the conventional wisdom reflects his view that wider 
participation generally makes the provision of public goods less likely. 
 
 1.  See Daniel Bodansky, What’s in a Concept? Global Public Goods, International Law, and 
Legitimacy, 23 EUR. J. INT’L L (forthcoming 2012); William D. Nordhaus, Some Foundational and 
Transformative Grand Challenges for the Social and Behavioral Sciences: The Problem of Global 
Public Goods (unpublished manuscript) (2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=1889357; Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, International Economic Law, “Public Reason”, and 
Multilevel Governance of Interdependent Public Goods, 14 J. INT’L ECON. L. 23 (2011); Gregory 
Shaffer, International Law and Global Public Goods in a Legal Pluralist World, EUR. J. INT’L L. 
(forthcoming 2012). 
 2.  DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 538 (1739). 
 3.  Id. 
 4.  ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 
210-11 (1802). 
 5.  MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF 
GROUPS 53 (1994). 
 6.  Id. at 35 (emphasis omitted). 
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National governments often overcome these challenges by stepping in 
and providing many important public goods at the national level, but at the 
global level, the lack of effective governance multiplies the challenge of 
collective action. Twenty-five years ago, Charles Kindelberger highlighted 
the fact that in a world without effective governance, it was unclear who 
would ensure the provision of global public goods.7 Contemporary 
economists continue to identify the lack of any “governmental 
mechanisms” for the provision of global public goods as the key obstacle to 
overcoming this market failure.8 The limited capacity of existing 
international institutions allows many national governments to free-ride 
rather than contribute and constrains progress on many key global public 
goods challenges. 
In response to these challenges, scholars have sought to categorize 
different types of global public goods in order to better understand the 
major obstacles to their provision. One of the most ambitious attempts to 
categorize global public goods was outlined by Scott Barrett in his book 
Why Cooperate?: The Incentive to Supply Global Public Goods. Barrett 
points out that some global public goods can be supplied only if every 
country cooperates, some global public goods demand the cooperation only 
of certain countries, and some require only the best effort of a single 
country.9 For “weakest-link” global public goods, which require the 
participation of every country for success, Barrett offers the example of 
smallpox elimination.10 In the case of smallpox, unless the population of 
every single country was successfully vaccinated, no country would benefit 
from the elimination of the threat posed by the disease. For “aggregate 
effort” global public goods, which require cooperation by some but not all 
countries, he offers the example of climate change mitigation.11 Without 
the major emitters reducing their emissions, reducing greenhouse gas 
production is unlikely to succeed, but it does not necessarily require all 
countries to participate in order to do so. For “single best-effort” global 
public goods, which may require action only by a single country, Barrett 
offers the example of deflecting an asteroid to prevent a collision with the 
 
 7.  See Charles Kindelberger, International Public Goods Without Government, 76 AM. ECON. 
REV. 1, 8 (1986). 
 8.  See William Nordhaus, Some Foundational and Transformative Grand Challenges for Social 
and Behavioral Sciences: the Problem of Global Public Goods 2 (Oct. 3, 2010) (unpublished 
manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1889357. 
 9. See SCOTT BARRETT, WHY COOPERATE?: THE INCENTIVE TO SUPPLY GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS 
2 (2007 ). Barrett’s work builds on the insights of Jack Hirsleifer, From Weakest Link to Best Shot: The 
Voluntary Provision of Public Goods, 41 PUB. CHOICE 371 (1983). 
 10.  Id. at 47-48. 
 11.  Id. at 74-102.  
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Earth.12 One country could develop the technology needed to protect 
against the planetary threat of an asteroid and provide a global public good 
that might protect all of humanity. 
Barrett’s typology is an extremely valuable contribution to analyzing 
how different kinds of global public goods might require different types of 
institutional responses to ensure adequate provision. Yet it suffers from two 
important weaknesses that can undercut its capacity to be translated into 
effective institutional design. First, many global public goods do not fit into 
only one of the categories which Barrett outlines. Indeed, in different parts 
of his book, vaccines emerge as a weakest-link public good, in terms of the 
difficulty of eliminating diseases in failing states;13 a single best-effort 
public good, in terms of the discovery of vaccines;14 and as an aggregate 
effort public good, in terms of financing mass vaccination campaigns.15 
Second, Barrett’s account focuses almost exclusively on the role of states 
but in the twenty-first century it is non-state actors who are increasingly 
central to ensuring the provision of global public goods. 
Looking at specific global health challenges, the difficulty in fitting 
different global public goods into neat categories becomes even clearer. In 
fact, many important global health challenges have the qualities of 
weakest-link, aggregate effort, and single best-effort public goods all at the 
same time. Instead of viewing these categories as referring only to different 
types of global public goods, it is more helpful to view them as 
highlighting different stages of the production of global public goods. In 
the context of global health, innovation often requires only a single best-
effort, while the financing of global public goods generally requires an 
aggregate effort, and compliance depends upon overcoming the challenge 
of the weakest-link. Understood in this way, these categories can be even 
more valuable in thinking about the type of governance structures which 
are required to ensure the provision of global public goods. At the same 
time, a clearer focus on these distinct production stages of global public 
goods reveals the limits of state-centric approaches and highlights the need 
to better incorporate the role of non-state actors into an analysis of global 
public goods. 
 
 12.  Id. at 22-37. 
 13.  Id. at 22-23. 
 14.  Id. at 54-57. 
 15.  Id. at 123-32. 
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II. GLOBAL HEALTH AND GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS 
Over the last decade, the framework of global public goods has 
increasingly been applied to analyze global health challenges.16 While 
many important global health issues cannot easily be categorized as global 
public goods challenges, controlling emerging infectious diseases and 
entirely eradicating diseases both lend themselves to such an analysis.17 
The prevention and containment of infectious or communicable diseases is 
a classic case of a global public good. A new strain of influenza, for 
example, could cause tremendous loss of life in all countries around the 
world. Eradicating a communicable disease, such as polio, is a special case 
which holds enormous potential global benefits. Eradicating polio and 
combating pandemic flu reveal the difficulty in categorizing specific global 
health challenges as different types of global public goods and highlight the 
increasingly important role of non-state actors in the provision of global 
public goods. 
A. Polio 
Polio eradication is at once a single best-effort, an aggregate effort, 
and a weakest-link global public good. Successful vaccination campaigns 
in Latin America catalyzed the launch of a Global Polio Eradication 
Initiative in 1988, which sought to build on the successful model of 
smallpox eradication.18 Tremendous progress since that time has been 
based on the discovery of a vaccine many decades earlier, the financial 
contributions of diverse donors, and the incorporation of decentralized 
approaches to ensuring compliance. Despite significant gains in recent 
years, complete polio eradication is not yet a reality.19 
The current polio vaccine was invented by a single scientist, funded 
by a single nation, and reflects the characteristics of a “single best-effort” 
global public good. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, who himself suffered 
from the disease, helped to establish the United States National Foundation 
 
 16.  See, e.g., David P. Fidler, Germs, Governance, and Global Public Health in the Wake of 
SARS, 113 CLINICAL INVESTIGATION 799 (2004). 
 17.  See Richard Feachem & Jeffrey Sachs, GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS FOR HEALTH: THE REPORT 
OF WORKING GROUP TWO OF THE COMMISSION FOR MACROECONOMICS AND HEALTH 4-5 (2002). 
 18.  R.W. Sutter & C. Maher, Mass Vaccination Campaigns for Polio Eradication: An Essential 
Strategy for Success, 304 CURRENT TOPICS IN MICROBIOLOGY & IMMUNOLOGY 195, 203-05 (2006). 
 19.  In the last decade of the twentieth century, polio cases declined by ninety nine percent from 
an estimated 350,000 to fewer than 500 cases by 2001. UNICEF, POLIO ERADICATION (2001), available 
at http://www.unicef.org/specialsession/about/sgreport-pdf/20_PolioEradication_D7341Insert _English 
.pdf; Earth Policy Institute, Two Stories of Disease: Smallpox and Polio (Sept. 15, 2011), 
http://www.earth-policy.org/data_highlights/2011/highlights19. 
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for Infantile Paralysis in 1938.20 The National Foundation lavishly financed 
a number of top scientists, including Dr. Jonas Salk who invented a vaccine 
after nearly a decade of focused research on polio.21 The National 
Foundation also conducted the Salk Vaccine Field Trials, involving nearly 
two million children in the United States, to test the efficacy of the 
vaccine.22 Without unprecedented investment by a single institutional actor 
in a single country, the polio vaccine, which is now so central to global 
eradication efforts, might not exist and certainly would have taken much 
longer to be developed. 
In terms of financing the eradication of polio, the ongoing challenge 
reflects the characteristics of an aggregate effort public good. Given the 
extremely high ratio of global benefit to the cost of disease eradication, one 
might expect that it would be among the easiest global public goods for 
which to secure financing. Yet even smallpox took nearly two centuries to 
eradicate. The international community struggled to raise the financing 
needed to complete the campaign to eliminate smallpox because the World 
Health Organization (WHO) lacked the authority to compel contributions 
from member states.23 Similarly with polio, the WHO found that the lack of 
adequate finance poses “the single greatest threat to realizing the historic 
eradication goal.”24 The polio eradication campaign was ultimately able to 
fund a comprehensive global response only because of significant 
contributions by non-state actors.25 The Rotary Club became one of the 
most important donors to the initiative, contributing approximately $1 
billion to the effort.26 In more recent years, the Bill and Melinda Gates 
Foundation has stepped into a key financing role and catalyzed renewed 
interest among many other donors.27 
Although the polio eradication campaign made enormous progress in 
its early years, efforts to secure the level of compliance necessary to 
eliminate the disease display weakest-link characteristics. Eliminating the 
last one percent of cases has proven enormously difficult and a resurgence 
 
 20.  DAVID OSHINSKY, POLIO: AN AMERICAN STORY-THE CRUSADE THAT MOBILIZED THE 
NATION AGAINST THE 20TH CENTURY’S MOST FEARED DISEASE 53 (2005). 
 21.  Id. at 5. 
 22.  See id. at 6.  
 23.  Scott Barrett, The Smallpox Eradication Game, 130 PUBLIC CHOICE 179, 180 (2007). 
 24.  Id. at 182. 
 25.  R. Bruce Aylward et al., Polio Eradication, in GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS FOR HEALTH 40 
(Richard Smith et al. eds., 2003). 
 26.  Id. at 41. 
 27.  UK and Gates Foundation Commit to Polio Eradication, U.K. DEP’T FOR INT’L DEV (Jan. 28, 
2011), http://www.dfid.gov.uk/news/latest-news/2011/polio-eradication-with-gates-foundation/. 
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of polio quadrupled the number of cases between 2001 and 2005.28 An 
important contributor to this reversal was the decision by several states in 
northern Nigeria to suspend their vaccination campaigns after some 
religious leaders endorsed rumors that the polio vaccine caused infertility.29 
In the wake of this reversal of progress, community ownership of 
immunization programs became a major priority in many areas of high 
non-compliance. After an outbreak in India, the Global Polio Eradication 
Initiative began successfully working with informal social networks and 
training community members as local champions.30 In India, religious 
leaders endorsed the vaccination campaign and thousands of women were 
recruited to spread the message door-to-door as part of an overall effort by 
2.3 million vaccinators to successfully vaccinate 900 million children in 
2011. As of the beginning of 2012, India was removed from the list of 
endemic countries but polio remains a serious challenge in countries such 
as Nigeria, Pakistan, and Afghanistan.31 
The example of polio highlights how a single global health challenge 
can at once reflect the characteristics of single best-effort, aggregate effort, 
and weakest-link public goods. Viewing these categories as reflecting the 
different stages of global public goods production offers greater 
understanding of the unique challenges involved in each stage of 
production. The challenge of polio eradication reveals the growing 
importance of non-state actors at each stage: from the discovery of the 
polio vaccine, to the resource mobilization for polio eradication, to 
successful vaccination campaigns in hard to reach communities. 
B. Pandemic Flu 
Among global health challenges, an emerging flu virus is one of the 
deadliest potential threats for which global collective action is required. In 
the United States alone, the Spanish influenza virus in the early twentieth 
century infected more than a quarter of the population and killed two and a 
half percent of all those infected.32 Although the most recent new flu strain 
proved less deadly than feared, it could well be a precursor to future 
mutations that pose a much greater threat. Without significantly improved 
 
 28.  Heidi Larson & Isaac Ghinai, Lessons from Polio Eradication, 473 NATURE 446, 447 (2011). 
 29.  Barrett, supra note 9, at 55. During the same period local families in northern Nigeria were 
suing a leading drug manufacturer for allegedly performing unethical clinical trials in the region. Larson 
& Ghinai, supra note 28, at 446. 
 30.  Larson & Ghinai, supra note 28, at 447.  
 31.  Simon Denyer, For India, a Milestone in the Fight Against Polio, WASH. POST, Jan. 12, 2012, 
at A10. 
 32.  Jeffrey K. Taubenberger, The Origins and Virulence of the 1918 ‘Spanish Influenza Virus’, 
150 PROC. AM. PHIL. SOC’Y 86, 90 (2006).  
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disease surveillance and tailored treatments, it will be extremely difficult to 
respond to an emerging flu virus. The different challenges involved in 
combating pandemic flu reflect the characteristics of single best-effort, 
aggregate effort, and weakest-link global public goods. 
Global surveillance of new strains of the flu virus highlights the 
weakest-link characteristics of pandemic flu. In 2003, the SARS crisis 
demonstrated the inadequacy of the existing legal framework for 
responding to emerging global health challenges. Article 21(a) of the 
Constitution of the WHO authorizes the adoption of regulations regarding 
“sanitary and quarantine requirements and other procedures designed to 
prevent the international spread of disease.”33 At the time, the WHO was 
only allowed to rely on national governments for confirmation of an 
outbreak within a given country. Amidst growing evidence of cases 
originating within China, the Chinese government refused to reveal that it 
had any cases of SARS.34 China did not even have a clear legal obligation 
to report these cases because the existing regulations did not adequately 
encompass new and emerging diseases. Under that system, the WHO was 
entirely dependent on voluntary compliance by states in reporting 
outbreaks.35 
In the wake of SARS, the WHO dramatically overhauled the 
International Health Regulations in order to better cope with the weakest-
link problem posed by the threat of emerging diseases.36 As a result, the 
WHO no longer needs to rely exclusively on state reporting and can utilize 
other sources of data, including information from non-state actors who are 
now integrated into the treaty’s surveillance functions.37 In addition, 
national governments are now obligated to report “all events that may 
constitute a public health emergency of international concern.”38 The 
regulations include an affirmative obligation for states to develop and 
maintain the capacity to detect, assess, and report new epidemics.39 Despite 
 
 33.  World Health Organization [WHO], Constitution of the World Health Organization, art. 21, 
para. (a), July 22, 1946, 14 U.N.T.S. 185. 
 34.  Fidler, supra note 16, at 801. 
 35.  Jeremy Youde, Mediating Risk Through the International Health Regulations and Bio-
Political Surveillance, 59 POL. STUD. 813, 817 (2011). 
 36.  David P. Fidler & Lawrence Gostin, The New International Health Regulations: An Historic 
Development for International Law and Public Health, 34 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 85, 86 (2006). 
 37.  David P. Fidler, Revision of the World Health Organization’s International Health 
Regulations, ASIL INSIGHTS (April 2004), http://www.asil.org/insigh132.cfm. 
 38.  World Health Assembly [WHA], Revision of the International Health Regulations, WHA 
Res. 58.3, art. 6 (May 23, 2005). 
 39.  Michael Baker & David P. Fidler, Global Public Health Surveillance Under New 
International Health Regulations, 12 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 1058, 1060 (2006). 
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these improvements, the first major test of the new regulations, in 2009, 
was less than a resounding success.40 
The challenge of financing the global response to pandemic flu 
reflects the characteristics of an aggregate effort global public good. While 
much of the global focus to date has been on surveillance and reporting, 
less attention has been given to the role of treatment in slowing or 
containing an emerging pandemic.41 Recent research has found that 
important spillover benefits exist for flu treatments, which create some 
incentive for wealthy countries to pay for treatment in low-income 
countries.42 While the most cost-effective approach would be for wealthy 
countries to provide medicines only to countries in which there is an active 
outbreak, this might not be feasible in a fast-moving pandemic and 
contributions to countries in proportion to their population could also be 
cost-effective.43 A further challenge raised by the prospect of treatment is 
that some countries, such as Indonesia, have previously refused to share 
virus samples with international authorities without guarantees they would 
receive an adequate supply of antivirals.44 Although this dispute prompted 
new guidelines by the WHO, providing for the sharing of viruses and 
vaccines, there is still no clear obligation for any country to share 
treatments with another country.45 Without a more effective aggregate 
effort to finance a global response, it is unlikely that the necessary level of 
global cooperation with respect to information sharing will be achieved. 
Unlike surveillance and financing, the innovation required to combat 
pandemic flu has most closely reflected the characteristics of a single best-
effort global public good. The WHO has limited capacity when it comes to 
supporting drug innovation and is even less able to respond as rapidly as 
required to develop new treatments to combat emerging flu strains. In 
contrast, the United States does have significant capacity to rapidly 
coordinate efforts to develop new treatments for flu and other emerging 
diseases. Its Project Bioshield involves a multi-billion dollar effort to foster 
 
 40.  Bradly Condon & Tapen Sinha, Chronicle of a Pandemic Foretold: Lessons from the 2009 
Influenza Epidemic 1 (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=1398445.  
 41.  See, e.g., Frank Smith, Look But Don’t Touch: Overemphasis on Surveillance in Analysis of 
Outbreak Response, 3 GLOBAL HEALTH GOVERNANCE (Spring 2010). 
 42.  Georgiy V. Bobashev et al., Policy Response to Pandemic Influenza 4 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
Res.Working Paper No. W17195, 2011). 
 43.  Id. at 41-42. 
 44.  Peter Gelling, Indonesia Still Refusing to Share Bird Flu Samples, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 
2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/26/world/asia/26iht-web-0326-flu.5030534.html.  
 45.  David P. Fidler & Lawrence O. Gostlin, The WHO Pandemic Influenza Preparedness 
Framework: A Milestone in Global Governance for Health, 306 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 200, 200-01 
(2011).  
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innovation against a range of potential disease threats, including the 
development of flu vaccines and antiviral treatments.46 Of course, the 
reliance on such a single best-effort to develop new treatments also 
highlights the related distributional challenges involved. Nonetheless, it 
seems unlikely in the near term that rapid innovation to confront new 
strains of the flu will be accomplished without such a single best-effort. 
Pandemic flu reveals the limits of trying to categorize global health 
challenges as either single best-effort, aggregate effort, or weakest-link 
global public goods. Instead, the case study suggests a more promising 
approach: to view these categories as highlighting the unique challenges of 
innovation, financing, and compliance. It also suggests that despite the 
priority that many state actors place on global preparedness for pandemic 
flu, the first reports of a new strain are as likely to come from non-state 
actors as from leading states. Re-conceptualizing the categories of global 
public goods helps inform the approach and participants required at 
different stages of global public goods production. 
III. RETHINKING GOVERNANCE FOR GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS 
As the specific case studies reveal, different strategies and institutions 
are required to respond to different stages of global public goods 
production. The challenge of innovation in the context of global health can 
often be accomplished through the efforts of a single country or a single 
actor. Financing for global health rarely requires the participation of all 
countries but usually depends upon contributions from a sufficient number 
of well-resourced countries. However, compliance often depends on nearly 
universal cooperation. New approaches to governance which take into 
account these discrete challenges are crucial to enhancing the provision of 
global public goods for health. While international institutions can 
overcome some of the coordination challenges involved in the production 
of global public goods, many of these institutions are not well placed to 
overcome the underlying free-rider problem. Incorporating non-state actors 
more fully into the governance of global health is one strategy that builds 
on their increasingly important role in the production of global public 
goods. Analyzing global health challenges through the lens of these 
different stages of global public goods production makes it clear how 
important non-state actors will be as part of the global response to health 
challenges. 
 
 46.  See FRANK GOTTRON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS 21507, PROJECT BIOSHIELD: PURPOSES 
AND AUTHORITIES 7-8 (2009).  
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A. Innovation 
Innovation is a major global health challenge because well-resourced 
countries and private-firms often lack sufficient incentive to make major 
investments in diseases which disproportionately affect people living in 
low-income countries. Non-state actors are becoming increasingly 
important in this realm with foundations providing critical early stage 
funding for the development of vaccines for many leading diseases. Yet 
neither current market incentives nor philanthropy have yet proven up to 
the challenge of fostering sufficient innovation when it comes to a wide 
range of infectious diseases. Of the nearly 1400 new medicines developed 
in the last quarter of the twentieth century, only one percent of these were 
drugs which responded to tropical diseases or tuberculosis.47 
The development of new malaria treatments reflects the crucial role 
for a “single best-effort” in the realm of innovation and drug development. 
To respond to the growing resistance of mosquitoes to existing treatments 
in Southeast Asia during the Vietnam War, the Chinese government 
employed 500 scientists over a period of fourteen years to identify a new 
treatment for malaria. Known as Project 523, the effort involved screening 
40,000 known chemicals and searching sources from traditional medicine 
in rural China.48 Ultimately, an herb that had been identified for its healing 
properties as far back as 168 B.C. was determined to quickly kill the 
parasites transmitted by malarial mosquitoes. The discovery proved to be a 
tremendous advance in the global response to malaria and is now used as 
standard treatment in combination with other slower acting drugs as part of 
the artemisinin combination therapy. Insecticide treated bed-nets similarly 
emerged from the efforts of national governments to reduce casualties from 
malaria during World War II.49 However, both artemisinin therapy and 
insecticide treated bed-nets only became widely available in low-income 
 
 47.  See Suerie Moon, Medicines as Global Public Goods: The Governance of Technological 
Innovation in the New Era of Global Health, GLOBAL HEALTH GOVERNANCE (Fall 2008/Spring 2009), 
http://www.ghgj.org/moon2.2medecinespublicgood.htm. 
 48.  World Health Organization [WHO], Ancient Chinese Anti-Fever Cure Becomes Panacea for 
Malaria: An Interview with Zhou Yiqing, Bulletin of the World Health Organization, 87.10 (2010), 
available at http://www.who.int/bulletin/volumes/87/10/09-051009/en/. 
In the United States, a parallel effort led by the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research to find new 
treatments for soldiers who were contracting malaria in Vietnam led to the development of mefloquine. 
See Christian Ockenhouse et. al., History of US Military Contributions to the Study of Malaria, 170 
MILITARY MED. 12, 14 (2005). 
 49.  Moon, supra note 47 at 4.  
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countries after new financing mechanism generated economies of scale 
which significantly drove down the unit costs of production.50 
While the example of malaria reflects the potential and limits of 
government led innovation, non-state actors are also playing an 
increasingly significant role in shaping the direction of global health 
research. A recent analysis of funding for major drug development 
initiatives focused on neglected diseases found that foundations accounted 
for more than three-quarters all investments.51 Non-state actors are also 
centrally involved in re-shaping the markets for many drugs in the 
developing world. Some of these actors are brokering long-term deals to 
lower the costs of medicines, while others helped to catalyze major generic 
producers to enter the market in the first place. The Gates Foundation alone 
invested nearly $12 billion overall in global health between 1994 and 
2008.52 One World Health, a drug development organization and the first 
non-profit pharmaceutical company in the United States, has contributed to 
new drugs now used against a range of infectious diseases.53  
Ultimately, the underlying challenge to generating innovation in the 
context of global health is to better align the incentives that link 
investments with results. Smarter incentive systems for innovation in 
global health become all the more important in motivating the necessary 
single best-effort in a world in which diverse sets of actors are involved in 
innovation. The incentives for global health innovation could be enhanced 
through the adoption of new kinds of reward systems. For example, a 
health impact fund might increase incentives for innovators to develop 
medicines for some of the major killer diseases around the world by 
rewarding them on the basis of lives saved in exchange for low-cost 
distribution.54 A closer alignment between investments in global health 
innovation and results is likely to be a critical feature of fostering future 
innovation. 
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 52.  Moon, supra note 47 at 11.  
 53.  See Challenging Models-Changing Minds, ONE WORLD HEALTH, http://www.oneworldhealth 
.org/history (last visited Feb. 25, 2012). 
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B. Financing 
Despite important progress over the last decade, the challenge of 
global health financing remains a major obstacle to the provision of global 
public goods and a challenge of aggregate effort, since it is rare that a 
single nation can or will invest the resources needed to generate an 
adequate supply of global public goods. At the same time, this aggregate 
effort increasingly involves diverse types of actors. The polio eradication 
campaign points to the direct role of non-state actors in global health 
financing, with the Rotary Club becoming one of the largest contributors 
overall to the effort and the Gates foundation emerging as a leading 
contributor in recent years.55 Just as important as this direct role in 
financing is the indirect role of non-state actors in catalyzing resource 
commitments by national governments. For example, the success of the 
Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization (GAVI) in resource 
mobilization reflects, in part, the strong sense of ownership by diverse 
stakeholders that has been fostered through their participation in the 
governance of GAVI.56 With the slow growth of development assistance 
for global health challenges, which doubled between 2001 and 2008,57 new 
financing mechanisms are likely to become increasingly important in 
delivering global public goods. A range of innovative financing 
mechanisms have emerged over the last decade to finance global public 
goods for health, but most of these mechanisms still require an aggregate 
effort. One innovative approach to financing eradication campaigns is 
through debt-swaps, in which countries that expand their immunization 
coverage are rewarded with lower levels of debt. The buy-down 
arrangement for polio eradication by the World Bank made a real 
contribution to ensuring the stable supply of vaccines in that country and to 
increasing levels of population immunity.58 
While the exact mechanisms vary, most current approaches to 
financing global public goods for health remain essentially voluntary. In 
some cases, these contributions are treated as assessments or dues, based on 
a fair share calculation, but nearly all investments by national governments 
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 56.  See Kenneth Abbott & David Gartner, Reimagining Participation in International 
Institutions, J. INT’L L. & INT’L REL (2012).  
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 58.  Muhammad Ali Pate, IDA Credit Buy-Down for Polio Eradication in Nigeria (2010) (Apr. 2, 
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in delivering global public goods for health are still voluntary.59 One 
mechanism which has moved beyond discretionary financing is UNITAID, 
which relies on designated airline taxes implemented at the national level to 
generate resources.60 Shipping and aviation fuel taxation has also been put 
forward as an approach to financing global public goods for health that 
would be less subject to the fluctuations in donor contributions.61 While 
distinct from the current voluntary mechanisms for mobilizing resources 
for global health, even these innovative mechanisms would still require the 
aggregate effort of a wide range of countries implementing these policies in 
order to be effective. The central challenge for global health financing is to 
move from purely voluntary mechanisms of fostering aggregate effort to 
more automatic mechanisms that catalyze adequate financing to deliver 
global public goods. 
C. Compliance 
One of the most difficult obstacles to delivering global public goods 
for health is the challenge of securing nearly universal compliance. When it 
comes to the surveillance and reporting of emerging diseases, the new 
International Health Regulations continue to lack effective enforcement 
mechanisms. In the global health context, there is no significant 
international capacity to impose costs for non-compliance within current 
legal and institutional arrangements. Nor are there mechanisms for 
individual states to enforce obligations through self-help, as is sometimes 
the case in other sectors. The challenge of compliance when it comes to 
global public goods for health remains a weakest-link problem in which 
new sources of pressure are often required to foster cooperation. 
In the absence of centralized tools that foster universal compliance, 
decentralized strategies often become the last line of global defense. The 
challenge of compliance in delivering global public goods for health 
depends upon the capacity of a wide range of actors to increase the costs to 
states of non-compliance and to help overcome resistance among sub-
national actors. Reaching universal compliance requires cooperation that 
extends to the level of local communities, to non-state actors, and even to 
individuals. Decentralized disease surveillance can serve as an important 
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global first warning system in the absence of effective state compliance 
with reporting requirements. 
Increased involvement by non-governmental organizations responding 
to the challenge of disease surveillance is extremely valuable in fostering 
decentralized compliance. The involvement of non-state actors has proven 
quite important to increasing rates of polio immunization; community 
participation was crucial to the acceptance of polio vaccines by parents in 
India and contributed to the decline of cases in northern Nigeria beginning 
in 2007.62 The weakest-link challenge in global health requires a 
decentralized approach to governance through which diverse actors can 
contribute directly to disease surveillance and catalyze states and sub-
national actors to cooperate in implementing global health interventions. 
CONCLUSION 
The concept of global public goods offers a useful frame for analyzing 
a range of pressing global health challenges. The categories of weakest-
link, single best-effort, and aggregate effort global public goods reveal 
distinct obstacles involved in responding to emerging infectious diseases 
and eradicating major diseases. Yet these categories are less helpful in 
differentiating particular global health challenges than they are in 
highlighting different dimensions or stages of these challenges. Innovation 
in the global health context is primarily a single best-effort problem, global 
health financing is usually an aggregate effort challenge, and compliance 
generally reflects a weakest-link problem. The recognition that different 
dimensions of global health challenges require distinct approaches suggests 
that diverse models of governance may be necessary to ensure the 
provision of global public goods for health. Innovation requires a better 
alignment of incentives with results, financing increasingly depends upon 
creating more automatic mechanisms for capturing resources, and 
compliance demands more decentralized means of enforcement. 
While global health is the focus here, it is plausible that these stages of 
innovation, financing, and compliance could usefully be applied to other 
types of global public goods as well. For example in the climate context, it 
is likely that innovation, in areas such as geo-engineering, will reflect a 
single best-effort. However, the financing of a comprehensive response to 
climate change will surely be a challenge requiring an aggregate effort. 
While the overall challenge of compliance mitigating greenhouse gases has 
sometimes been framed as an aggregate effort problem, it could also be 
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viewed as a weakest-link problem since it likely requires the participation 
of all the major emitters to be successful. Without the involvement of both 
China and the United States no climate agreement has much chance of 
ultimate success regardless of the aggregate effort of other nations. 
In applying the concept of global public goods to contemporary global 
challenges, existing tools of analysis can be applied in innovative ways in 
order to better understand the key challenges involved in innovation, 
financing, and compliance. At each key stage, non-state actors are 
transforming the landscape of global public goods production and 
highlighting the need for new forms of governance. Contrary to the 
conventional wisdom that wider participation is an obstacle to effective 
collective action, incorporating a wider range of stakeholders can 
strengthen the global capacity to deliver global public goods. 
 
